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*  The authors are grateful to V. Périlleux and A. Bruggeman for their valuable 
advice, and to N. Masschelein for writing the box.
(1)  For a summary of this process, see Périlleux V. and Wibaut Q. (2004).
(2)  The existence of this liquidity premium originates from the liquidity preference 
theory of J.M. Keynes, which states that investors prefer assets which are least 
susceptible to capital losses due to a change in interest rates. As the risk of 
capital loss increases over time, long-term securities are therefore more vulnerable 
to these losses and thus less liquid than short-term securities. According to this 
theory, long-term securities should therefore offer a higher interest rate than 
short-term securities in order to compensate the investor for this type of risk.
In Belgium, as elsewhere in the euro area, bank lending 
is an important source of ﬁ  nance for companies and indi-
viduals, and the lending rates charged by credit institu-
tions therefore play a decisive role in the transmission of 
monetary policy. This article analyses the determination of 
lending rates charged by Belgian banks on the basis of the 
available statistical information, which recently underwent 
some fundamental changes.
Section 1  offers an overview of the key determinants 
of credit institutions’ lending rates, and includes a box 
describing the impact of the solvency requirements. 
Section 2 analyses the transmission of monetary policy 
impulses to the risk-free market interest rates for various 
maturities, followed by the pass-through from market 
interest rates to the lending rates charged by Belgian 
banks. Section 3 draws ﬁ   rst lessons from the new 
statistics on bank interest rates for the period June 2003-
May 2004.
1.   Main determinants of bank lending 
rates
Bank lending rates are a key link in the monetary policy 
transmission process  (1). The central bank has tight control 
over very short-term money market rates. Changes in 
these rates affect the longer term interest rates on the 
money and bond markets, because those longer term 
rates must correspond to the combination of current 
and expected future short-term rates and a risk premium 
linked to the uncertainty over that future development, 
plus a possible liquidity premium  (2). The risk-free yield 
curve forms a basis for determining the banks’ lending 
rates, since it inﬂ  uences the cost of their resources and 
can also be regarded as an opportunity cost of lending.
The banks set their deposit rates below the risk-free yield 
curve, at least as regards “retail funds”, as they offer 
depositors a ﬂ  exibility and service which are not available 
on the direct ﬁ  nance market. They set their lending rates 
at a higher level in order to cover, among other things, 
their administrative expenses and the credit risk. Since 
they often practise maturity transformation, their liabilities 
having a shorter duration than their assets, the interest 
margin will also be inﬂ  uenced by the slope of the risk-free 
yield curve, which is positive on average (reﬂ  ecting the 
interest rate risk, i.e. uncertainty over future short-term 
interest rates).44
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Lending rates are inﬂ  uenced by a series of factors other 
than the risk-free yield curve. These factors result from the 
speciﬁ  city of the loan market and may also feel the effects 
of monetary policy decisions.
By deﬁ  nition, the ﬁ  nancial markets do not feature perfect 
competition with perfect information. A loan is not a con-
ventional commodity, but a promise to repay which may 
prove worthless (risk of default). The information is asym-
metrical – the lender does not have as much information 
as the borrower about the latter’s ability and willingness 
to repay the sum borrowed – which leads to the problems 
of moral hazard (risk that the borrower may fail to meet 
his obligations) and adverse selection (risk of attracting 
the least reliable borrowers). The banks play an essential 
role in the ﬁ  nancial system by reducing the problem of 
asymmetric information, as they specialise in selecting and 
monitoring borrowers, and take on the credit risk.
The ﬁ  xed costs and the risk associated with this function 
have to be paid for, and are therefore also factors which 
determine lending rates. The existence of ﬁ  xed  costs 
explains why the interest rate on small loans is higher 
than that on large loans. The existence of default risks 
leads to variations according to the borrower, the term of 
the loan, the collateral provided (mortgage, etc.) and even 
the size of the banks (law of large numbers). In addition, 
these risks are inﬂ  uenced by the economic situation and 
therefore also by the effect of monetary policy on overall 
demand. This comes under the heading of “balance sheet 
channel” in the transmission of monetary policy via credit 
(“credit view”)  : all other things being equal, a tighten-
ing of monetary policy increases the default risk, because 
the contraction of demand for goods and services in the 
economy and the increase in interest charges cause a 
deterioration in the balance sheet position of borrowers  ; 
the increase in longer term interest rates also reduces the 45
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(1)  Cf. for example Stiglitz J. E. and Greenwald B. (2003).
Box  –  Impact of capital requirements on interest margins
N. Masschelein
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision has now ﬁ  nalised the second Basle Accord which will take effect 
at the end of 2007. In the ﬁ  rst accord dating from 1988, this committee stipulated that banks must maintain a 
minimum capital totalling 8 p.c. of the risk-weighted assets. The second accord aims to achieve a better match 
between the amount of capital that a bank must set aside for loans and the risk proﬁ  le of the borrower. Since the 
costs of holding this capital are taken into account in the interest margin, a reduction or increase in the capital 
requirements according to the level of creditworthiness will be reﬂ  ected in a reduction or increase in the interest 
margin.
Basle II provides for two ways of calculating the capital requirements to cover the credit risk  : the standardised 
approach and the internal ratings based approach or IRB. The standardised approach is the less advanced method 
and comes closest to Basle I. In this approach, the creditworthiness of a counterparty is determined on the basis 
of external ratings, set by independent credit rating agencies (such as S&P, Moody’s or Fitch IBCA). Banks applying 
the sophisticated method can use internal rating models to calculate their capital requirements.
These capital requirements are meant to form a buffer to cope with unexpected losses. Unexpected losses are 
deﬁ  ned as the difference between the expected losses and a certain limit value as determined by the Value-at-Risk 
or VaR concept (see chart below)  (1). Under Basle II, this limit value was set in such a way that the regulatory capital 
requirements are sufﬁ  ciently high to cover all losses with the exception of the extreme 0.1 p.c. of cases. In other 
words, there is a 0.1 p.c. risk that a deteriorating situation in the loan portfolio may cause the bank to fail.
!
(1)  The expected (or average) losses are covered by forming provisions. The amount of these provisions is calculated by taking the probability of counterparty default 
and multiplying it by the losses incurred if that counterparty defaults and the size of the claim. The VaR (Value at Risk) is a method of calculating potential losses in 
a loan portfolio with a particular reliability interval and for a particular period (usually one year in the case of the credit risk). For more details of this method, see BIS 
(1999).
value of the collateral (property, equities) ; the banks there-
fore have to impose tighter restrictions on lending  (1).
The asymmetric information and other market imperfec-
tions also affect the other aspect of banking activity, the 
raising of funds. For that reason, we must go back to the 
cost of the funds. Owing to the imperfections of the ﬁ  nan-
cial markets, the balance sheet structure of the banks plays 
a role – their liquidity and solvency, and the availability 
or non-availability of deposits at low interest – as does 
the banks’ position on the capital market, particularly 
their size, which makes it easier or less easy for them to 
ﬁ  nance themselves by issuing securities. The absence of 
perfect substitutes to deposits as resources for the banks 
lies at the root of another channel for the transmission of 
monetary policy, namely the credit channel in the narrow 
sense, or the “bank lending channel”  : all other things 
being equal, a tightening of monetary policy which leads 
to higher market interest rates encourages the economic 
agents to replace deposits (earning lower interest) with 
securities, and the reduction in deposits forces the banks 
in turn to restrict the supply of loans.46
In practice, however, most banks set a percentile which is lower than 0.1 p.c. so that the capital held by these 
banks exceeds the amount speciﬁ  ed by the regulations. One of the main reasons for this is the importance of 
the disciplinary role of the market. Banks very often choose a limit value which corresponds to a desired external 
rating, because in many cases a good external rating is necessary in order to guarantee access on attractive terms 
to certain important markets (such as the interbank market).
We can illustrate the impact of the new capital requirements on the interest spread by means of an example. We 
assume that the bank applies the internal ratings based approach and that it aims at a return on equity (ROE) of 
13 p.c. We also take the case of a bank making a loan to a large enterprise  (1).
The table below shows the impact of the borrower’s risk proﬁ  le on the provisions and the capital requirements. 
For an enterprise with a default ratio of 0.14 p.c. (corresponding to an A rating by S&P) and a loss given default 
(LGD) of 45 p.c., the bank holds provisions totalling at least 0.06 p.c. Basle II requires an additional buffer for 
unexpected losses of at least 2.72 p.c.  (2) That corresponds to capital costs of 0.35 p.c. For a loan granted to an 
enterprise with a default ratio of 2 p.c. (corresponding to a BB rating by S&P), Basle II requires a capital ratio of at 
least 8.67 p.c. This capital requirement entails capital costs of 1.13 p.c. Both the provisions and the capital costs, 





























(1)  A large enterprise is one with a turnover of more than € 50 million. Basle II has special rules covering loans to SMEs.
(2)  For the exact formulas for calculating the capital requirements, see the accord itself (www.bis.org). Here, a scale factor of 1.06 was applied as currently proposed by 
Basle. That may change in the future.
!47
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IMPACT OF THE CREDIT RISK ON PROVISIONS AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
(as p.c. of the claim, except for the probability of default)
(1) It is not possible to make a straight comparison between these capital requirements and the 8 p.c. set by Basle I, because the concepts used are different. It should 
be borne in mind that the general aim of Basle II is to tailor the capital requirement more closely to the risk incurred by each individual bank, but not necessarily to 










ROE = 13 p.c.
Total costs 
(capital and provisions)
0,02 (AA) 45 0.01 0.86 0.11 0.12
0.14 (A) 45 0.06 2.72 0.35 0.41
0.75 (BBB) 45 0.34 6.25 0.81 1.15
2,00 (BB) 45 0.90 8.67 1.13 2.03
In addition, the prudential regulations, which impose 
minimum capital requirements according to the risk-bear-
ing assets, inﬂ  uence the attitude of the banks towards risk 
and the cost of the resources required, in the knowledge 
that equity is more expensive than deposits (see box).
Finally, the lending rates are not, of course, determined on 
the basis of the average costs regardless of any interaction 
with demand for credit, but are also dependent on the 
characteristics of the credit market. On the one hand, the 
level of competition inﬂ  uences prices, as on any market, 
and that has repercussions on proﬁ  ts and even on the 
ﬁ  xed costs in so far as the employees receive part of any 
monopoly rent. Taking account of the characteristics of 
the relationship between a bank and its borrower, it is 
possible that the banking sector may feature monopolistic 
competition, in which each bank is confronted by demand 
that is not perfectly elastic and where the “law of one 
price” does not apply. The level of competition and the 
elasticity of demand may vary according to the type of 
loan and the circumstances.
On the other hand, the speciﬁ   c characteristics of the 
ﬁ  nancial markets are also a factor in the type of interac-
tion between the supply and demand for credit. In fact, 
it is not necessarily in the banks’ interest to increase their 
lending rates : above a certain threshold, there is a danger 
that customers with the least risky projects will be discour-
aged, while it is mainly potential borrowers for the riskiest 
projects (and even over-optimistic or deceitful borrowers) 
who will be attracted (adverse selection), so that the 
effect of the increased default outweighs the effect of the 
higher interest rate, and the expected return declines. In 
these circumstances, it makes sense for the banks to stick 
to that maximum interest rate and to ration any additional 
demand for loans.
It is therefore evident that the lending rates need not 
reﬂ  ect the bank ﬁ  nancing conditions as a whole. Banks 
which have built up a long-term relationship with their 
customers are better equipped to assess the risks and will 
have less need to resort to rationing, which will tend to 
be conﬁ   ned to new borrowers. Finally, the regulations 
on lending rates may sometimes involve rationing. That 
is only the case at present for consumer credit, where 
maximum rates were ﬁ  xed in order to protect the weak-
est consumers  : the ﬁ   nancial institutions may not lend 
money at a rate which exceeds the (very high) maximum 
rates, and are thus obliged to refuse credit to borrowers 
presenting the highest risks  ; that helps to curb excessive 
debt levels.
2.   The transmission of monetary policy 
impulses to bank lending rates
The efﬁ  ciency of the monetary policy transmission proc-
ess depends on various parameters, such as the size 
and speed of the adjustments which credit institutions 
make to deposit and lending rates following a change 
in the central bank’s key rate. As already stated, the 
central bank only has direct control over very short-
term interest rates. However, ﬂ  uctuations in these 
rates affect the yield curve to varying degrees, and may 
inﬂ  uence the rates applied by ﬁ  nancial institutions. The 
rates at which banks remunerate deposits and grant 
loans are a key factor affecting the majority of deci-
sions by economic agents concerning consumption, 
savings or investment. The behaviour of the ﬁ  nancial 
institutions is therefore of fundamental importance, 
since these institutions may reinforce, weaken or even 
neutralise the impact of monetary policy on the real 
economy.48
(1)  This survey was replaced by a new harmonised survey of interest rates in the euro 
area (MIR : MFI Interest Rates), introduced at the instigation of the ECB at the 
beginning of 2003, which will be discussed in section 3. Where discount credit 
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This section discusses the transmission of monetary policy 
impulses to lending rates charged by Belgian banks, and 
can be divided into two stages. The ﬁ  rst stage will examine 
how changes in the overnight rate affect the other inter-
est rates on the risk-free yield curve. That is followed by 
an analysis of the impact of ﬂ  uctuations in these market 
rates on lending rates with similar maturities. The advan-
tage of this two-stage approach is that it takes better into 
account the marginal costs of the ﬁ  nancial  institutions 
and does not confuse two different mechanisms.
The market interest rates considered here are the rates on 
Belgian government debt securities. The data used for the 
lending rates were obtained from the old survey of Belgian 
credit institutions (RIR : Retail Interest Rates  (1)) covering the 
period from January 1993 to December 2003. The rates 
thus recorded relate to six types of contract, two of which 
are intended for individuals and four for companies. The 
year 1993, when short-term interest rates see-sawed as a 
result of the crisis in the European exchange rate mecha-
nism, was eliminated from the sample.
In the period considered, 1994-2003, interest rates were 
lower than in the two preceding decades, which had 
begun with accelerating inﬂ  ation followed by the gradual 
restoration of the credibility of monetary and ﬁ  scal policy 
in the majority of industrialised countries, and which 
ended with the effects of the German reuniﬁ  cation. 
During the ﬁ  rst  ﬁ   ve years of the period under review, 
which preceded the start of European monetary union, 
interest rates generally followed a downward trend. In 
the ensuing ﬁ  ve years they initially increased in response 
to the economic boom and the inﬂ  ationary pressure, and 
then subsided again.
2.1  From the central bank rate to the market rates
The central bank’s key interest rate acts as a benchmark 
for money market interest rates and inﬂ  uences  longer 
term interest rates. However, the longer the maturity, the 
more market interest rates are affected not just by the risk 
and liquidity premiums but also by expectations regarding 
future movements in short-term interest rates, which are 
in turn dependent on macroeconomic variables, such as 
the outlook for growth and inﬂ  ation, as well as the cred-
ibility of the policy conducted by the central bank. Other 
variables, such as the movement in yields on the US bond 
market, also affects the level of long-term interest rates 
in the euro area and in Belgium. At the end of the day, 
the effect of a ﬂ  uctuation in the key rate is uncertain. 
For example, an increase in that rate may have hardly 
any impact on longer term interest rates because it was 
expected  ; then again, it may trigger a knock-on effect 
because it is regarded as sustainable owing to better 
growth prospects  ; and ﬁ   nally, it may cause long-term 
interest rates to fall if it contributes towards restoring the 
credibility of the central bank in an inﬂ  ationary context.
If we take the overnight rate on the money market, over 
which the central bank has fairly tight control, we ﬁ  nd that 
the interest rates on treasury certiﬁ  cates with a maturity 
of less than one year track its movements fairly closely. In 
contrast, the yield on linear bonds, with a longer maturity, 
may move entirely in the opposite direction for a time. For 
instance, in the ﬁ  rst half of 1994, short-term interest rates 
fell by more than 200 basis points, continuing the down-
ward trend which started in 1993 after the exchange 
rate crisis, while long-term interest rates increased by an 
equivalent amount, as a result of a contagion effect fol-
lowing the US bond market crash. Similarly, the hopes of 
an economic recovery on both sides of the Atlantic in late 
2001 and early 2002 caused long-term interest rates to 
rise by just under 100 basis points, while short-term rates 
dipped by around 50 basis points, before stabilising.49
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(1) This  speciﬁ  cation is deliberately simple because the analysis aims to present 
a general picture of the broad trends in the transmission of changes in the 
interest rate controlled by the central bank to the risk-free yield curve. It takes 
no account of the impact of risk and liquidity premiums or of the effect of other 
economic variables on the determination of the level of interest rates. In the light 
of the Phillips-Perron and ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) tests, the hypothesis 
of the non-stationarity of all the series used cannot be rejected. In addition, the 
hypothesis of the absence of co-integration can be rejected for 1-month, 
2-month and 3-month treasury certiﬁ  cates. However, for clarity we have also used 
the error correction speciﬁ  cation in the case of market interest rates for which the 
hypothesis of the absence of co-integration cannot be rejected in so far as the 
estimated coefﬁ  cients for the degree of transmission in the short and long term 
are statistically no different from those calculated by using the autoregressive 
distributed lag model, which is more suitable in this case. As regards the number 
of lags in the market rate and the overnight rate in the short-term dynamics, the 
Akaike and Schwarz criteria would have suggested richer speciﬁ  cations (up to 
twelve lags in terms of level). However, the usefulness of this simple speciﬁ  cation 
lies in the fact that the degree of pass-through can be calculated more easily in 
the medium term. Finally, in order to attenuate the correlation of the residues in 
the equations for the rate on 12-month treasury certiﬁ  cates and for the yield on 
3-year and 5-year linear bonds, the right-hand term also comprises the change in 
the market interest rate after a lag of one period.
TABLE 1 DEGREE OF TRANSMISSION OF THE OVERNIGHT RATE TO THE LONGER TERM MARKET INTEREST RATES
Source: Own calculations.
Note: The standard deviations are shown in brackets.
Within the month After 3 months After 6 months After 12 months In the long term
1-month treasury certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.92 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.05) (0.02)
2-month treasury certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.88 0.96 0.99 1.01 1.01
(0.06) (0.04)
3-month treasury certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.82 0.91 0.96 0.99 1.00
(0.07) (0.06)
6-month treasury certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.64 0.72 0.78 0.85 0.95
(0.08) (0.17)
12-month treasury certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.46 0.62 0.80 0.85 0.89
(0.09) (0.27)
3-year linear bonds  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.18 0.35 0.51 0.63 0.79
(0.10) (0.43)
5-year linear bonds  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.02 0.13 0.23 0.38 0.70
(0.10) (0.54)
The pass-through of changes in the overnight rate to the 
other market interest rates was estimated for the period 
from January 1994 to June 2004 using the non-linear 
least squares method on the basis of equations with an 
error correction term in the following form  (1) :
t t t t t cbr mr cbr mr ε δ γ β α + ∗ − ∗ − ∆ ∗ + = ∆ − − ) ( 1 1   (1)
where mr is the market interest rate (rates on 1-month, 
2-month, 3-month, 6-month and 12-month treasury 
certiﬁ  cates, yields on 3-year and 5-year linear bonds) and 
where cbr corresponds to the overnight rate. Coefﬁ  cient 
β refers to the degree of transmission in the short term, 
more precisely within the month, while coefﬁ  cient δ rep-
resents long-term transmission and ε is the error term.
It must be made clear that this econometric analysis 
can only reﬂ   ect part of the impact of monetary policy 
on market interest rates. In fact, the movements in the 
market rates may precede the changes to the central 
bank rate owing to expectations regarding the future 
monetary policy stance. Thus, if a reduction in the key 
rate is expected, that may affect market rates even before 
it is implemented. However, the analysis takes no account 
of this effect.
Subject to that reservation, pass-through within the 
month seems to be fairly high overall for treasury cer-
tiﬁ  cates, although it does tend to decline sharply as the 
maturity lengthens  : it ranges from 0.92 for 1-month 
treasury certiﬁ   cates to 0.46  for 12-month treasury cer-
tiﬁ  cates. As regards long-term interest rates, the impact 
within the month is slight in the case of 3-year linear 
bonds and virtually nil for 5-year bonds.
The long-term pass-through of overnight rate ﬂ  uctuations 
to market interest rates is complete or almost complete 
for maturities of up to one year. For the maturities of more 
than one year considered, it is 0.7 or more. Although it 
therefore appears that the central bank interest rate 
may – at least in part – have a knock-on effect on the 
longer term interest rate, that effect does not materialise 
immediately but only after a varying length of time. That 
is one of the reasons against overestimating the ability of 
monetary policy to prime the pump of economic growth 
in the short term by cutting the key rates.50
(1)  Except for discount credit where the interest rate corresponds to the average of 
the interest rates offered by the three biggest banks.
(2)  The term of the reference interest rate corresponds to that expressly stated in the 
various standard contracts, except for cash credit on which the reference rate was 
selected on the basis of the correlations.
(3)  Cf. table 4.
(4)  The null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected for the various 
lending rates obtained from the RIR survey at the usual levels of probability. 
The assumption of the absence of co-integration can be rejected in the case of 
ﬁ  xed-term advances, mortgage loans and investment loans. However, we also 
used the speciﬁ  cation with error correction for discount credit, cash credit and 
consumer credit in so far as the estimated coefﬁ  cients for the short and long 
term pass-through are statistically no different from those calculated by using the 
autoregressive distributed lag model, which is more suitable in this case. Finally, 
a dummy was introduced into the consumer credit equation, in order to take 
account of the change of deﬁ  nition, introduced in January 1996.
(5)  The hypothesis that the estimated transmission coefﬁ  cient is equal to 1 in the 
long term cannot be rejected using standard levels of proability.
Furthermore, the amount of time taken for the actual 
effect of a change in the central bank rate to be fully 
reﬂ  ected in market interest rates increases as the maturity 
lengthens  : in the case of 1-month treasury certiﬁ  cates, 
the eventual impact is almost fully apparent after three 
months, whereas it takes roughly a year in the case of 
3-month treasury certiﬁ  cates  ; in the case of 5-year linear 
bonds, only just over half of the ﬁ  nal impact of the change 
in the overnight rate is observed after twelve months.
Finally, the econometric analysis clearly illustrates the 
theoretical ﬁ  ndings outlined above, particularly the fact 
that the effect of a change in the central bank rate on 
market interest rates becomes more uncertain and vague 
as the maturity lengthens. The more the market rates 
relate to longer maturities, the steeper the decline in 
the accuracy with which the pass-through is estimated, 
so that in the case of 5-year bonds the sign of both the 
short-term and the long-term pass-through is statistically 
not determined.
2.2   From market interest rates to bank lending rates
The comparison of the offered rates on standard contracts, 
obtained from the RIR survey  (1), with the corresponding 
reference rates  (2) reveals that there are substantial differ-
ences in the size of the adjustments made to lending rates 
by the Belgian banks.
As regards short-term loans, the changes in the money 
market rate were reﬂ   ected promptly and more or less 
completely in the interest rate on ﬁ  xed-term advances, 
a ﬁ   nancial instrument designed mainly for large enter-
prises. The rates offered by the banks on cash credit and 
discount credit seem to take a little longer to adjust but 
they were adapted fully up to the end of 2000. Since that 
date, interest margins on these last two credit categories 
have widened considerably  : cuts in the interest rate on 
short-term risk-free instruments took longer to be passed 
on in the interest rates offered, and the reductions were 
no longer entirely proportionate.
Similarly, it is evident that since the end of 2000 the mar-
gins on long-term loans granted to both businesses and 
individuals have increased. In this connection it is interest-
ing to note that the interest rate offered to companies on 
investment loans – which until 2002 tallied fairly closely 
with the yield on euro area corporate bonds with a com-
parable duration and a BBB rating – deviated from that 
rate in 2003 and has risen towards the yield on corporate 
bonds with a lower rating, namely BB. However, it must 
also be said that the interest rates actually charged – as 
recorded by the new survey – were considerably lower in 
the second half of 2003 than the rate on investment loans 
according to the RIR survey  (3).
It is possible that the increase in the margins on most 
short-term and long-term loans resulted from an adjust-
ment to the conditions applied in neighbouring coun-
tries, owing to cross-border mergers of credit institu-
tions. This is probably also due to the economic gloom, 
the problems caused by a number of loans granted at 
the end of the last decade and the prospect of a new 
Basle Accord.
Over the period January 1994-December 2003 as a 
whole, the pass-through of market interest rate changes 
to lending rates is estimated on the basis of aggregate 
data per product line, using equations with an error cor-
rection term in the following form  (4):
t t t t t mr br mr br ε δ γ β α + ∗ − ∗ − ∆ ∗ + = ∆ − − ) ( 1 1   (2)
where br is the lending rate and mr the market interest 
rate for a corresponding maturity. Once again, the coef-
ﬁ  cients β and δ correspond respectively to the degree of 
transmission in the short and long term, while ε repre-
sents the error term.
It is estimated that transmission within the month is 
complete in the case of ﬁ  xed-term advances and in the 
order of 90 p.c. for investment loans and 80 p.c. for 
cash credit and discount credit. In contrast, only 40 p.c. 
of the change in the reference rate is passed on imme-
diately in the rates charged on mortgage loans, and less 
than 30 p.c. in the case of consumer credit. Over a long 
period  (5) the various lending rates are aligned in full, 
or almost in full, with the market rate, except in the 
case of consumer credit. The Belgian credit institutions 
therefore appear to adjust the rates on loans to busi-
nesses more promptly and completely than the rates on 
personal loans.51


























































































































































































CHART 3  LENDING RATES CHARGED BY BELGIAN BANKS AND REFERENCE INTEREST RATES
Sources : Bloomberg, NBB.
(1)  The definition of consumer credit was changed in January 1996.
(2)  Yield on euro area corporate bonds with a BBB rating and a term of between three and five years.
(3)  Yield on euro area corporate bonds with a BB rating and an average duration of just over four years.
Fixed-term advances
Rate on 6-month treasury certificates
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TABLE 2 DEGREE OF TRANSMISSION FROM MARKET INTEREST RATE TO LENDING RATES CHARGED BY BELGIAN BANKS
Source: Own calculations.
Note: The reference rate is shown in brackets (T2 corresponds to 2-month treasury certificates, OLO3 to 3-year linear bonds).
Within the month After 3 months After 6 months After 12 months In the long term
Discount credit (T2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.83
Cash credit (T2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.85
Fixed-term advances (T6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.10 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
Consumer credit (OLO3)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.27 0.56 0.59 0.59 0.59
Mortgage loans (OLO5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.41 0.64 0.76 0.85 0.88
Investment loans (OLO5)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.85 0.82
TABLE 3 COMPARISON OF THE ESTIMATED DEGREES OF TRANSMISSION
Sources: De Graeve et al. (2004) and own calculations.
Note: De Graeve et al. (2004) estimate the degree of transmission on the basis of panel data with co-integration where it occurs. The optimum number of lags in the 
specifications is selected on the basis of the Schwarz criterion, with a maximum of six lags, in levels, for the lending rate and the corresponding market rate. The standard 
deviations are shown in brackets.
Within the month In the long term
This article De Graeve et al. This article De Graeve et al. (2004)
Discount credit  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.78 0.67 0.83 0.85
(0.06) (0.06) (0.14) (0.04)
Cash credit  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.79 0.66 0.84 0.82
(0.05) (0.05) (0.21) (0.03)
Fixed-term advances  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.10 1.01 0.95 0.92
(0.18) (0.09) (0.02) (0.04)
Consumer credit  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.27 0.19 0.59 0.69
(0.12) (0.10) (0.05) (0.09)
Mortgage loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.41 0.35 0.88 0.87
(0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Investment loans  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.89 0.79 0.82 1.01
(0.07) (0.06) (0.20) (0.03)
(1)  On the basis of the standard deviations calculated by De Graeve et al. (2004).
In the ﬁ  rst case, we slightly overestimate the scale of the adjustment, while in the 
second case we underestimate it.
A recent study by De Graeve et al. (2004), which was also 
conducted on the basis of the RIR survey data, but taking 
account of measurement errors and the heterogeneity of 
the banks, comes to comparable conclusions as regards 
the scale of the transmission in the short and long term, 
namely that the adjustment of the rates on loans to indi-
viduals appears to be slower and less than proportionate, 
compared to the rates on loans to companies. Although 
our estimates on the basis of the aggregate data differ 
somewhat from the results of the said study, the differ-
ences are not statistically signiﬁ  cant, except in the case 
of the short-term coefﬁ  cient for cash credit and the long-
term coefﬁ  cient for investment loans  (1).
As regards the bank characteristics which inﬂ  uence 
the degree and speed with which bank interest rates 
are aligned with changes to the market interest rate, 
De Graeve et al. (2004) ﬁ  nd that credit institutions with a 
higher capital ratio and greater liquidity pass on changes 
in market interest rates more slowly and less than pro-
portionately in their deposit and lending rates. Finally, the 
degree of pass-through seems to decline with the bank’s 
market share in a particular ﬁ  nancial product.53
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(1)  A more detailed account of the method may be found on the Bank’s website : 
www.nbb.be/DQ/MIR/N/method_1.htm or www.nnb.be/DQ/MIR/F/method_1.htm.
(2)  The new MIR survey covers ten instruments relating to new contracts for 
deposits and loans to households and non-ﬁ  nancial corporations, for varying 
terms. Altogether, there are 31 rates, including 18 lending rates and 2 annual 
percentages rates of charge on loans to households.
(3)  In the case of overdrafts, on the basis of the outstanding amounts.
(4)  The weighting on the basis of the amounts of the new contracts makes this 
even more difﬁ  cult ; this is because shorter term loans tend to be given a higher 
weighting since they are renewed more often.
(5)  The interquartile interval is deﬁ  ned as the difference between the ﬁ  rst quartile 
and the third quartile ; it comprises 50 p.c. of the data and is not sensitive to 
extreme observations.
3.   The new harmonised interest rate 
survey
3.1   Features of the new survey
In January 2003, the ECB launched a new survey (MIR 
survey  : MFI Interest Rates) on the interest rates which 
monetary ﬁ  nancial institutions in the euro area apply to 
their customers. In Belgium, this new survey replaced the 
RIR survey (Retail Interest Rates), mentioned in the preced-
ing section.
The Belgian part of the MIR survey differs in many respects 
from the RIR survey  (1). First, while the old survey data were 
provided voluntarily by the banks, the selection of partici-
pants in the MIR survey is based on a stratiﬁ  ed random 
sample, which ensures that the survey is far more repre-
sentative. Second, while the previous survey concerned 
normalised standard contracts, which were not necessar-
ily representative of the activity of each reporting bank, 
the categories covered by the MIR survey  (2) may comprise 
products which are commercially very divergent, if those 
products have certain characteristics in common. Third, 
in the new survey the interest rates are weighted on the 
basis of the amounts of new credit actually granted by 
each declarant in each category  (3), while in the earlier 
survey the rates notiﬁ  ed by the banks were weighted on 
the basis of the outstanding amounts for the categories 
in their balance sheet which roughly corresponded to the 
standard contract. Fourth, the rates recorded via the new 
survey are the contractual interest  rates, i.e. the rates 
actually applied, whereas the earlier survey referred to 
the advertised rates, without taking account of any com-
mercial negotiation.
These substantial methodological differences cause a 
break in the series. That is evident from the following 
table, which compares the average results for the two 
surveys for the second half of 2003, a period in which, 
one can assume, the new survey had already got over 
any “teething troubles”, and the old survey was still 
continuing.
3.2  Preliminary results for Belgium
The MIR survey results have not been available long 
enough – especially as the observations for the initial 
months could be less reliable – to conduct a meaning-
ful chronological analysis, such as an analysis of the 
pass-through of market interest rate changes. Moreover, 
the movements in the market interest rates have been 
relatively small in recent months. For those reasons, the 
analysis will be conﬁ  ned to the initial conclusions which 
can be drawn from the average levels of the lending rates 
charged by Belgian banks during the one-year period 
ending in May 2004, and their dispersion.
The structure of the lending rates per type of loan clearly 
shows the effects of the amount, duration and risk of 
the loan. The contractual rates for loans to corporations 
vary in inverse proportion to the size of the loan. That is 
because of the ﬁ  xed costs, but it may also indicate a nega-
tive correlation between the size of the borrower ﬁ  rms 
and the assessment of the risk. The rates charged increase 
with the term of the loan. That reﬂ  ects the positive slope 
of the risk-free yield curve over the period considered 
(the difference between ﬁ  ve-year and three-month rates 
averaged 1.4 percentage points), but may also point to 
an increase in the spreads according to the duration, on 
account of the higher risk of long-term loans. Since the 
data on the lending rates are calculated on the basis of 
maturity intervals, however, it is difﬁ  cult to compare them 
with the risk-free yield curve  (4). Finally, the rates on loans 
for house purchase, which are systematically backed by 
a mortgage in Belgium, are relatively low. The statistics 
do not make any other distinctions on the basis of the 
credit risk.
Lending rates applied to households are usually higher 
than those applied to corporations, perhaps mainly 
because of the amounts being borrowed.
As a yardstick of the rate dispersion, the interquartile 
interval  (5)  also provides some interesting information. 
The rate dispersion may be due to the heterogeneity of 
the credit characteristics, particularly the risks. It may also 
indicate a lack of competition, since competition would 
cause prices to converge. However, such an interpretation 
must be treated with due caution, since cartels could also 
lead to a reduction in the rate dispersion.
There is a positive correlation between the dispersion 
of the rates and their level. It is greatest in the case of 
overdrafts, followed by consumer credit, and is lowest 
for house purchase loans. The heterogeneity of the 
risks appears to be the dominant factor, since there is 54
(1)  The results of the simple linear regression (on the basis of the individual data) 
show the positive inﬂ  uence of the capital ratio on the level of interest rates for 
virtually all eighteen products; the coefﬁ  cient is signiﬁ  cant (at 90 p.c.) for six of 
these products.
TABLE 4 COMPARISON OF THE RESULTS OF THE SURVEYS OF LENDING RATES CHARGED BY BELGIAN BANKS
(Average level in the second half of 2003)
Source: NBB.
MIR survey RIR survey









Loans to non-financial corporations
Overdrafts 7.37 Cash credit (basic rate) 6.81
Loans ≤ € 1 million ≤ 1 year 3.78 Fixed-term advance € 250,000 to 
375,000 (most solvent customers)
6 month 2.99
> 1 year ≤ 5 year 4.01 Investment loan € 125,000 to 250,000 
(lowest rate)
5 year 6.34
> 5 year 5.00
Loans > € 1 million ≤ 1 year 2.90
> 1 year ≤ 5 year 3.24
> 5 year 4.37
Loans to households
Overdrafts 10.45
Consumer credit ≤ 1 year 6.65
> 1 year ≤ 5 year 7.76 Loan subject to flat-rate charges, 
purchase of a new car, € 7,500 
(basic rate)
3 year 6.73
> 5 year 9.28
Lending for house purchase ≤ 1 year 3.57
> 1 year ≤ 5 year 4.32 20-year mortgage loan (lowest 
advertised rate)
5 year 4.97
> 5 year 
 
≤ 10 year 4.64
 
> 10 year 4.74
Other lending
 
≤ 1 year 3.95
 
> 1 year 
 
≤ 5 year 4.43
 
> 5 year 5.09
apparently no correlation between the degree of con-
centration in the various markets and the rate disper-
sion. Thus, the concentration is below average in the 
home loan market, where the rates applied fall within 
a narrow margin, but also in the case of overdrafts, 
where there is a wide rate dispersion.
A brief examination of the impact of some individual 
characteristics of the reporting banks on their lend-
ing rates conﬁ  rms a number of the ﬁ  ndings made by 
Bruggeman A. and Wouters R. (2001) on the basis of 
the RIR survey data.
There is a positive correlation between the banks’ capital 
ratio, measured on the basis of the capital and reserves as 
a percentage of the balance sheet total, and the lending 
rates they charge  (1). The explanatory variable is the credit 
risk  : a higher capital ratio requires the granting of loans 
generating higher returns, and thus representing higher 
risks, in order to achieve a particular return on the equity. 
Conversely, relative specialisation in higher risk lending 
requires better solvency.55
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CHART 4  LENDING RATES CHARGED BY BELGIAN BANKS AND CONCENTRATION INDICES PER LOAN TYPE
  (Average June 2003-May 2004)
Source : NBB.
(1)  Sum of the squares of market shares, calculated on the basis of new contracts (outstanding amounts for overdrafts). The higher the index, the greater the concentration on the 
market  segment.





Loans to non-financial 
corporations
between 1 and 5 years
> 5 years
between 1 and 5 years
between 5 and 10 years
> 10 years
between 1 and 5 years
> 5 years
between 1 and 5 years
> 5 years










Loans ≤ € 1 million
Loans > € 1 million
Average rate
Interquartile interval
(1) The  coefﬁ  cient is estimated as negative for all products, signiﬁ  cant (at 90 p.c.) 
for ﬁ  ve products.
(2) The  coefﬁ  cient is estimated as negative for most products, signiﬁ  cant (at 90 p.c.) 
for nine products.
In contrast, the more liquid banks, i.e. those with a higher 
proportion of cash, interbank loans and other short-term 
assets in their balance sheet total, seem to charge lower 
rates  (1). The availability of a stock of liquid assets creates 
scope for granting loans which are generally claims with 
relatively low liquidity.
Finally, the size of the banks measured on the basis of their 
balance sheet total usually has a negative inﬂ  uence on the 
interest rate level  (2). Various interpretations are possible. 
The banks could tend to pass on in their rates the scale 
advantages gained in terms of access to cheaper sources 56
(1) The  coefﬁ  cient is estimated as negative for most products, signiﬁ  cant (at 90 p.c.) 
for six products.
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CHART 5  LENDING RATES IN BELGIUM AND IN THE EURO AREA
  (Average June 2003-May 2004)
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of ﬁ  nance and risk diversiﬁ  cation (law of large numbers), 
rather than exploiting a dominant position to push up the 
average level of their margins – the correlation between 
market share per type of loan and the rates applied is also 
usually negative  (1). In addition, there is a negative correla-
tion between the size and the degree of capitalisation, 
which may indicate that smaller banks specialise in riskier 
loans. Furthermore, large corporations whose average risk 
is probably assessed as lower and which have access to 
means of funding other than bank loans, deal mainly with 
the big banks.
These initial indications can be supplemented by a 
more detailed analysis once longer statistical series are 
available.
3.3  International comparison
The harmonised statistics of the MIR survey offer the 
ﬁ   rst opportunity to make a valid comparison between 
Belgium and the euro area. With occasional exceptions, 
the differences during the period June 2000-May 2004 
were minimal.57
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As regards loans to non-ﬁ  nancial corporations, the Belgian 
rates are below the euro area average for the majority of 
the loans, i.e. loans up to 1 million euro, on which the 
rates are ﬁ   xed for the short or medium term. In con-
trast, interest rates on overdrafts are signiﬁ  cantly higher. 
The difference between the rates for small amounts as 
opposed to large amounts is less in Belgium than in the 
euro area, regardless of the period for which the interest 
rate is initially ﬁ  xed. It should be remembered that this dif-
ference may be due to the ﬁ  xed costs entailed in granting 
loans, but it may also reﬂ  ect some differentiation between 
large enterprises and other ﬁ  rms.
As regards loans to households, the interest rates for 
mortgage loans in Belgium are very close to the average 
European rates, but overdrafts are more expensive. Where 
consumer credit is concerned, various deviations occur. 
However, the annual percentage rate of charge, which 
represents an average of all rates applied, weighted on 
the basis of new business, taking account of the costs of 
taking up the loan, is close to the European average.
Conclusion
The way in which credit institutions adjust their lending 
rates is one of the parameters determining the efﬁ  ciency 
of the monetary policy transmission process. By studying 
the banks’ behaviour it is therefore possible to arrive at a 
better assessment of the presumed effects of monetary 
policy decisions on the real economy. This article shows 
that the central bank exerts an inﬂ  uence  over  lending 
rates, but to varying degrees, as other factors also play 
a role.
The central bank only has tight control over very short-
term interest rates on the money market. Changes in 
these rates inﬂ  uence the other, longer term market rates 
which in turn form the basis for determining the bank 
interest rates. In accordance with economic theory, it 
seems that the pass-through of the overnight rate to the 
risk-free market interest rates becomes weaker, slower 
and more uncertain the longer the term considered. The 
pass-through of the market rates to lending rates, studied 
on the basis of the results of the earlier survey of bank 
interest rates, presents a mixed picture.
The Belgian credit institutions seem to adjust rates on 
business loans more promptly and fully than rates on 
loans to individuals. In the case of consumer credit, the 
transmission is only partial, even over a long period. Also, 
the data from the earlier survey indicate a widening of the 
spreads between most lending rates and the market rate 
for comparable maturity during the period 2001-2003.
One of the reasons for these wider spreads could be 
alignment with conditions in neighbouring countries, as 
a result of cross-border mergers of credit institutions. Be 
that as it may, the new harmonised survey of bank inter-
est rates shows that the lending rates charged by Belgian 
credit institutions are currently very close to the euro area, 
average with a few exceptions  : they are lower for short 
and medium-term corporate lending, but signiﬁ  cantly 
higher for overdrafts.
The results of the new survey reveal that the average lend-
ing rates vary according to the amount, duration and risk 
of the loan. There are particularly wide dispersions in the 
case of rates on overdrafts and consumer credit. There 
appears to be a positive correlation between a bank’s 
capital ratio and the level of its lending rates, while the 
size and liquidity of the banks exert the opposite effect.58
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